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FOREIGN JURISDICTIONAL ALGEBRA and KIOBEL v.
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM: FOREIGN CUBED AND
FOREIGN SQUARED CASES

by

Robert S. Wiener*

INTRODUCTION
In its recent term, the United States Supreme Court
appears to have decided unanimously in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum1 that U.S. federal courts cannot hear and decide
foreign cubed cases. These are cases with three fundamental
foreign elements: in which a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign
defendant for acts committed on foreign soil.2 Justice Breyer
in a concurring opinion joined by three other justices and
Justice Kennedy in another concurring opinion seem to have
left the jurisdictional door ajar, at least for foreign squared
cases in which only two of the three foreign factors exist. This
paper analyzes the Kiobel case’s four opinions and considers
possible foreign squared scenarios.3
This international law case raises the jurisdictional
question, what can the courts of one country do in response to
multinational corporate support of government-sponsored
atrocities in another country? The issue is whether a state4 can
_________________
*Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Pace University, Lubin
School of Business
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decide the legal fate of foreign corporations for acts against
foreign nationals in a foreign country. Specifically, in this
case, under the United States Alien Tort Statute (ATS),5 can
United
States federal courts adjudicate a civil suit brought by Nigerian
citizens (Kiobel et al.) who now reside in the U.S. against
corporations incorporated in foreign countries (here the
Netherlands,6 England,7 and Nigeria8) for allegedly aiding and
abetting atrocities by the Nigerian government in Nigeria?9
I. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to hear and
decide a case. To have that authority, a court must have
jurisdiction both over the subject matter of the case and over its
parties. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is particularly problematic
because it is the assertion of the power to make legal
judgments for acts outside the geographic territory of the
court’s government. Such a claim is difficult when the
territory is international such as on “the high seas” and in the
territory of no country. It is even more complicated when the
disputed acts are alleged to have occurred in another
government’s geographic territory and, therefore, there may be
conflicting jurisdictional claims.
A court might exercise jurisdiction on a number of
bases, but, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is
presumptuous for one country to impliedly claim that it can
provide justice better than another country, especially when the
other country has closer connections to the case. From the
perspective of serving one’s own citizens, why should money
from government coffers be used to provide judicial services to
citizens of other countries? If the rationale is that it serves the
country’s diplomatic interest, shouldn’t the country’s political
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branches, that is, its executive and legislative branches, make
that decision rather than its judicial branch? If the rationale is
concern for international human rights, shouldn’t an
international body make that decision?10
Extraterritorial11 jurisdiction may be based on bilateral
or multilateral agreements, or upon one or more of the
following basic principles for international jurisdiction.12
1. Territoriality: over acts within a state’s geographic
territory with extraterritorial effect
2. Nationality: over citizens of one’s state who cause
harm outside that state’s territory
3. Protective: to protect one’s state from harm resulting
from extraterritorial acts
4. Passive personality: to protect one’s citizens outside
the state’s territory
5. Universality: to prosecute acts seen universally as
crimes, regardless of where they occurred13
II. ALIEN TORT STATUTE
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS), adopted in the Judiciary
Act of 1789,14 states
The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States
28 U.S.C. § 1350 : US Code – Section 1350: Alien’s action
for tort15
It had rarely been used for two centuries until the
Second Circuit in the 1980 case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala16 and
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the United States Supreme Court in the 2004 case of Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain17 decided that private parties could bring
claims under “federal common law.”18 The original question in
this case was whether the ATS substantively covers the acts
claimed, but re-argument was ordered on the jurisdictional
question of “whether a claim may reach conduct occurring in
the territory of a foreign sovereign.”19
Sometimes what is omitted from an opinion is as
important as what is included. The Second Circuit had
dismissed the Kiobel complaint on the grounds that “the law of
nations does not recognize corporate liability.”20 This issue
was not even mentioned in any of the U.S. Supreme Court
Kiobel opinions; in other words, corporate liability was
assumed arguendo. This is an important point. It means that
the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided that corporations may
not be sued under the Alien Tort Statute. That result would
have established a barrier against suits based upon ATS
jurisdiction against all corporations, domestic or foreign,
regardless of whether the plaintiff, defendant, and location of
the acts in question were foreign.
III. FOREIGN CUBED CASES: KIOBEL SUPREME
COURT OPINIONS
Despite unanimity as to the result by the U.S. Supreme
Court in the case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, four
separate opinions were reported. Therefore, predicting how
this case will function as a precedent under stare decisis is
somewhat complicated.
A. Opinion of the Court21
Chief Justice John Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of
the Court, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony
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Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, Jr. Roberts
wrote “[t]he question presented is whether and under what
circumstances courts may recognize a cause of action under the
Alien Tort Statute, for violations of the law of nations
occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States.”22
Kiobel et al. argued that the ATS does indeed provide
for extraterritorial U.S. jurisdiction under “[t]he law of
nations,” otherwise known as “customary international law,”23
under circumstances such as aiding and abetting such acts as
“(1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3)
torture and cruel treatment; (4) arbitrary arrest and detention;
(5) violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and
association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction.”24
However, the majority decided that there is no extraterritorial
jurisdiction, regardless of the existence of the circumstances
above, in foreign cubed cases, that is, when there are three
basic foreign elements, a foreign plaintiff sues a foreign
defendant for acts committed on foreign soil. It based its
decision on “[t]he presumption against extraterritorial
application.”25 Under this technical principle of statutory
construction, a domestic statute does not have extraterritorial
application unless such application is clearly indicated.26 This
approach avoids the foreign affairs implications of unintended
conflicts with foreign laws.27 And it reflects the desire of the
judicial branch to leave foreign policy decisions with “the
political branches.”28 The majority acknowledged that the
language of the ATS does not hint at a territorial limitation of
its jurisdiction, yet here it deferred to this often ignored
presumption regardless. In Sosa, by contrast, extraterritorial
application was apparently assumed by the Supreme Court,
with jurisdictional concern for foreign policy implications
limited to a narrow interpretation of the relevant law of nations
as “specific, universal, and obligatory.”29
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The majority did consider possible grounds that might
rebut the presumption against extraterritorial application of the
ATS including:
1. Text of the statute -- construction of the ATS. But if
found nothing explicitly demanding its extraterritorial
application.30
2. Transitory torts doctrine -- that a tort, regardless of
where it occurred, can provide for jurisdiction over a
civil action wherever subject matter and personal
jurisdiction can be obtained.31 But observed that this
doctrine may have been applicable in Sosa where the
grounds were U.S. law, but not in this case where the
law was foreign law.32
3. Stare decisis – judicial history and three applicable
offenses referred to in prior cases to assert
extraterritorial application of the ATS, “violations of
safe conducts, infringement of the rights of
ambassadors, and piracy.”33 But argues that “[t]he first
two offenses have no necessary extraterritorial
application”34 and that one of four contemporary cases35
were extraterritorial. The third offense, “piracy,”
according to the majority, typically occurs “on the high
seas” and, therefore, outside of any country’s territory,36
where no country has territorial jurisdiction. Therefore,
foreign policy consequences are “less direct” and the
offense of “piracy” does not justify jurisdiction over
acts on foreign soil, as in this case.37
4. Nationality principle -- the majority read a 1795
opinion by Attorney General William Bradford as an
ambiguous38 nationality principle case, restricting
jurisdiction to U.S. citizens for acts on foreign soil.39 In
this case the defendant corporations were not U.S.
citizens.
5. Legislative history -- analysis of the intent of the
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drafters of the Alien Tort Statute. The majority quoted
an opinion forty years after passage of the ATS as proof
that its authors did not intend “to make the United
States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement
of international norms”40 and claimed that imputing
legislative intent to apply the ATS to acts in foreign
countries would be “implausible.”41
Therefore, the majority ruled that since the ATS is a
domestic statue and extraterritorial application is not clearly
indicated for this type of case, application of the presumption
against extraterritorial application dictated that the ATS did not
have extraterritorial application in this foreign cubed case.
Justice Roberts ended his opinion by raising the specter
of unintended “serious foreign policy consequences,”42
including a tit-for-tat backlash of lawsuits against “our
citizens” in the courts of other nations for “alleged violations of
the law of nations occurring in the United States, or anywhere
else in the world.”43 This seems to be the kind of foreign
policy analysis Justice Roberts, earlier in his opinion, reserved
to the other “political” branches of government.
B. Concurring Opinion: Kennedy44
Justice Kennedy is often the “swing vote” in the current
U.S. Supreme Court’s 5-4 decisions. Therefore, even though
this case was unanimous decision and Kennedy joined the
opinion of the court, it is important to pay attention to his
additional independent concurring opinion as it may be crucial
in deciding a future extraterritorial jurisdiction foreign squared
case or possibly even in foreign cubed cases with different
facts, such as no legal recourse elsewhere.
Kennedy asserted that questions here are left open and
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that this case is not the final chapter on the ATS45 and,
especially, his concern for a legal response to human rights
abuses outside the United States. “Many serious concerns with
respect to human rights abuses committed abroad have been
addressed by Congress in statutes such as the Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA) [not including cases against
corporations] …, Other cases may arise with allegations of
serious violations of international law principles protecting
persons.”46
C. Concurring Opinion: Alito47
Justices Samuel Alito, Jr. and Clarence Thomas agreed
with C.J. Roberts that the case should be decided on the narrow
grounds that, in an ATS case with “claims [that] touch and
concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application”48 and for there to be extraterritorial
federal jurisdiction. However, Justice Alito wrote an additional
concurring opinion, joined by Thomas, stating a preference for
a broader isolationist49 standard, affirming the presumption
against extraterritorial application by using a “focus’ of
congressional concern” test and re-asserting the Sosa
requirements, with a statutory construction emphasizing the
legislative intent of the 1789 authors of the ATS.50
D. Concurring Opinion: Breyer51
Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justices Ruther Bader
Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, concurred with
the Court’s judgment, but not its reasoning. They rejected
Roberts’s reliance on “the presumption against
extraterritoriality.”52 Instead, “guided in part by principles and
practices of foreign relations law,” they would adopt ATS
jurisdiction based upon territoriality, nationality, or protective
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principles: “where (1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil
[territoriality] (2) the defendant is an American national,
[nationality] or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and
adversely affects an important American national interest”
[protective].53 Key is Justice Breyer’s definition of important
American national interests as including “a distinct interest in
preventing the United States from becoming a safe harbor (free
of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or other
common enemy of mankind.”54 Breyer, like Alito, quoted
Sosa, but more expansively, focusing on its general
principles.55 However, the facts in Kiobel did not meet any of
these standards and, therefore, federal court jurisdiction should
not be granted here.
A basic distinction among the approaches of Breyer,
Roberts, and, especially, Alito, is their jurisprudence,
specifically their approaches to statutory construction.
Whereas Alito interpreted the ATS as limited to whatever was
of concern in 1789, and Roberts constrained the ATS with a
restrictive presumption against extraterritoriality principle,
Breyer referred to the Sosa characterizations of the legislative
history as providing “18th-century paradigms” for judges to
fashion “a cause of action” “based on the present-day law of
nations.”56 Breyer, in his evolutionary judicial approach, noted
that the purpose of the ATS was to grant a cause of action
where none existed before and, therefore, frames the key
question as “Who are today’s pirates?” providing a remedy to
those harmed “when those activities take place abroad.”57
Breyer rejected application of the “presumption against
extraterritoriality” to the ATS, a statute enacted “with ‘foreign
matters’ in mind.”58 He also rejected a legal “distinction
between piracy at sea and similar cases on land,” noting, for
example, that crimes on a flagged ship are within the
jurisdiction of that nation as though they were on land.59
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Justice Breyer’s core position on the role of the courts
concerning international human rights violations is that “just as
a nation that harbored pirates provoked the concern of other
nations in past centuries…so harboring “common enemies of
all mankind” provokes similar concerns today.”60 Thus
Breyer’s presumption is different from that of Roberts; “I
would assume that Congress intended the statute’s
jurisdictional reach to match the statute’s underlying
substantive grasp.”61
To help determine the proper jurisdictional scope of the
ATS, Breyer referred to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, including its Section 402 jurisdiction principles
of territoriality,62 nationality,63 protective,64 and, universality.65
At the same time, Breyer accepted jurisdictional limitations,
such as exhaustion of legal remedies, forum non conveniens,
and comity, as well as courts “giving weight to the views of the
Executive Branch.”66
Breyer then cited, with apparent approval, two lower
federal court decisions that accepted ATS jurisdiction where
the alleged conduct violated well-established international law
norms and the defendant was present in the United States when
the suit was filed, although both plaintiff and defendant were
foreign nationals and the acts occurred outside of the U.S.67
Breyer observed that such an approach “is consistent with
international law and foreign practice” citing foreign authors
and courts that accept jurisdiction of cases where the acts
occurred abroad.68
Breyer observed that if Congress was concerned as to
the judicial interpretation of the extraterritorial reach of the
ATS by federal courts since Filartiga in 1980 or since Sosa in
2004, it could have limited the substantive or jurisdictional
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reach of the ATS by legislation, but it did not.
Therefore, Breyer concluded that his approach is
consistent with Sosa and should not cause concern that other
countries will respond by “hal[ing] our citizens into their courts
for alleged violations of the law of nations occurring in the
United States, or anywhere else in the world.69
However, it would “reach too far to say” that there are
grounds for jurisdiction based on the facts of this particular
case – where foreign nationals sue two foreign corporations
with minimal presence in the United States (a New York City
office owned by an affiliated company) for acts such as torture
they allegedly helped but did not directly engage in.70
IV. FOREIGN SQUARED CASES: POST-KIOBEL
Once again, one of the most important elements of
majority opinion is what was omitted. Among the significant
questions left open is whether there might be jurisdiction under
principles of nationality or territoriality. The majority opinion
apparently closed U.S. courts to cased based on ATS
jurisdiction when the case is a “foreign cubed” case, that is,
where “a foreign plaintiff is suing a foreign defendant for acts
committed on foreign soil.”71 However, whether federal courts
have ATS jurisdiction over “foreign squared” cases, where one
of these three elements is domestic, that is, either the plaintiff
or the defendant is a U.S. national (nationality) or the act is
committed in the U.S. (territoriality) remains unclear.72
It is possible that as many as seven of the justices,
excluding Justices Alito and Thomas as a result of their broad
concurring opinion, would decide that at least some foreign
squared cases that “touch and concern the territory of the
United States -- with sufficient force” overcome the
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presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction.73 However,
this is not an easy reading of Robert’s opinion.
Four justices, Breyer and the three justices joining him,
seem squarely behind extraterritorial jurisdiction in some
foreign squared cases. But four does not a majority make;
therefore such jurisdiction appears to depend on Justice
Kennedy. The possibility of U.S. federal court extraterritorial
jurisdiction is enhanced by Kennedy’s dicta in his opinion.
Other cases may arise with allegations
of serious violations of international
law principles protecting persons, cases
covered neither by the TVPA [Torture
victim Protection Act] nor by the
reasoning and holding of today’s case;
and in those disputes the proper
implementation of the presumption
against extraterritorial implementation
application may require some further
elaboration and explanation.
Even though the vote was unanimous against
extraterritorial jurisdiction in this case, Kennedy’s vote may be
the swing vote in a foreign squared case, or even in a case
based upon non-ATS jurisdiction. And that might well focus
on whether the United States should judicially ignore the
equivalent of modern-day piracy, possibly including not only
actual piracy,74 but also offenses against international law.

CONCLUSION
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The Kiobel case is likely to result in continued efforts to
bring foreign squared cases against multinational corporations
under ATS jurisdiction and even to bring foreign cubed cases
under other theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction.75
If there were an international court with jurisdiction
over alleged civil violations of the law of nations anywhere in
the world against individuals and business organizations, this
issue would be moot. As long as such a court remains a pipe
dream, the majority of the United States Supreme Court may
be prepared to stand idly by, with our political branches
allowing grave human rights violations to occur against
persons in foreign countries who then have no legal redress for
their grievances.76 But that might be a topic for an
international business ethics paper.
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A Continuing Trend To Define Scope of Kiobel, LAW360, NEW YORK
(Jan. 16, 2014, 12:48 AM),

http://www.law360.com/articles/500958/a-continuing-trend-todefine-scope-of-kiobel.
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Cf. Joe Sexton, Reviving Kitty Genovese Case, and Its Passions, N.Y.
TIMES (July 25, 1995)
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/25/nyregion/reviving-kitty-genovesecase-and-its-passions.html

